Outsourcing Contracts and Equity Prices
The outsourcing decision is fundamental to management of the modern firm. Core business functions such as R&D, product development, and marketing are being externalized across a wide range of industries to achieve strategic objectives that shape a firm's competitive position. Global outsourcing of IT and IT-enabled business processes is projected to grow in excess of $US650 billion by the end of 2011. By 2012, over 50% of the average firm's IT budget will be expended on outsourcing providers (Willcocks and Craig (2007) . Despite its broad scope and appeal, researchers and practitioners have highlighted a high failure rate of outsourcing, 1 with adverse impacts 1 Seventy percent of the respondents in a 2005 survey by Deloitte Consulting expressed significant dissatisfaction with their outsourcing projects. According to SAP INFO Solutions, four out of five inked outsourcing contracts will need to be renegotiated within two years. Further, 20% of all such contracts will collapse ("Successful on critical performance metrics. Thus an important research question involves what type(s) of outsourcing engagements create(s) market value and under what conditions. What are some of the factors that help manage uncertainty and complexity of the outsourcing initiative? Are such factors equally important in all types of outsourcing initiatives? In pricing outsourcing events, are capital markets efficient or slow to incorporate information about the complexity of the outsourcing engagement and mitigating factors? An important managerial choice in outsourcing is that of the governing contract. The latter is generally categorized as either fixed price or variable price.
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Business Process Outsourcing," Intelligence Section, Sloan Management Review, Winter 2006, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 5-6) . 2 Although there are variations of fixed and variable price contracts, our thesis is that the market may be slow to incorporate even the coarse information implied by a partition of the contract space into fixed and variable prices.
Empirical research in economics posits that firms choose the contract to minimize economic trade-offs between ex ante provision of incentives and ex post renegotiation of contractual specifications (Bajari and Tadelis 2001) , or ex ante contractual specification of the outsourced task and ex post inefficiencies of costly bargaining and privately favorable redistribution of surplus (Crocker and Reynolds 1993) , or contractual completeness and coordination failures (Yang 2001) . Outsourcing initiatives characterized by greater uncertainty in business requirements and coordination between participant firms are more likely to be governed by variable price contracts accompanied by lower levels of completeness in task specification and a higher probability that adaptations are needed than in fixed price contracts; the latter are associated with higher levels of completeness and a lower probability that adaptations are needed (Bajari and Tadelis 2001) . Thus, the outsourcing contract is a proxy for the uncertainty in business requirements and coordination complexity-fixed price contracts are indicative of a relatively stable business environment and simple coordination requirements, whereas variable price contracts indicate higher business uncertainty and complexity in coordination.
We posit that it is easier to realize performance gains from outsourcing in fixed price engagements than in variable price contracts. The underlying task is more measurable and verifiable in fixed price contracts, and hence, its ownership and control can be easily transferred to the vendor. Thus, an armslength relationship without significant investments in coordination or relationship management is generally sufficient to ensure success in fixed price outsourcing initiatives (Mani et al. 2012 , Yang 2001 .
However, in variable price engagements involving higher uncertainty in business requirements and complex coordination, it is difficult and costly to specify ex ante potential contingencies and responses thereof. Thus, in these dynamic, complex engagements, the contract alone is inherently limited in its ability to protect the outsourcing firm; success may hinge on relational norms and procedures that foster trust to address incentive conflicts as well as appropriate coordination mechanisms that cultivate a shared understanding of the outsourced task to address cognitive conflicts , Gulati et al. 2005 . Thus, while complex outsourcing initiatives may involve large payoffs, they also involve a significantly higher risk of failure and performance losses. We draw on extant research (Mayer and Argyres 2004, Gulati 1995) to argue that relational learning, which occurs through repeated interactions with an exchange partner, helps reduce the risk of failure in complex outsourcing engagements. In particular, prior association with the provider helps foster trust, formalize responses to the provider's behavior, and ease transacting through familiarity with the provider's structures and processes. Similarly, experiential learning of the outsourcing firm, through repeated exposure to similar alliances, allows for wider specification of contingencies and responses thereof, and enhances ex post adaptation by facilitating interpretation and response to unforeseen contingencies. Better knowledge of outsourcing procedures through experience also helps the outsourcing firm identify appropriate relational processes and technologies that enhance coordination with the provider. Thus, prior association with the vendor and experience in managing outsourcing relationships reduces the risk of failure in complex variable price initiatives to positively influence the financial outcomes thereof.
Because large-scale outsourcing decisions involve major changes in the structure and governance of the value chain, we seek to investigate the impact of such decisions on shareholder value. We also posit that the market value resulting from outsourcing initiatives is associated with operational efficiency changes due to the initiative. Thus our study includes both shareholder returns and operational efficiency impacts of outsourcing practices. Although the IS literature has generally focused on announcement period returns for assessing the value of outsourcing decisions, we note that information on the context and management of the initiative, including business uncertainty, coordination requirements, the firm's relationship with the vendor, its prior experience in managing outsourcing relationships, or governance mechanisms, is rarely described in the outsourcing firm's accounting statements or the outsourcing announcement. Yet, these factors may be critical antecedents to outsourcing success. Such information, referred to as intangible information in the finance literature (Daniel and Titman 2006) , involves acquisition costs and learning costs of interpretation to predict payoffs. The market is slow to incorporate such intangible information in the stock price of the outsourcing firm. Consequently, we adopt a long-term approach to computing abnormal returns following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. Based on theories of institutional economics, strategy, organizational learning, and finance, we develop and test three hypotheses involving the long-term market reactions to outsourcing initiatives characterized by (i) low uncertainty and coordination requirements; (ii) high uncertainty and coordination requirements, where the outsourcing firm shares prior association with the provider; and (iii) high uncertainty and coordination requirements, where the outsourcing firm has prior experience in outsourcing management.
Our data, comprising the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives announced between 1996 and Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 .2] on 16 November 2014, at 02:23 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Information Systems Research 24(4), pp. 1028 -1049 , © 2013 2005, are primarily obtained from International Data Corporation's (IDC) annual reports on the largest outsourcing contracts signed each year in the sample time period. Company data from COMPUSTAT and SDC Platinum, and stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) complements contract data. Consistent with prescriptions of the finance literature, we calculate three-year abnormal returns for portfolios of fixed and variable price contracts relative to a size-and book-to-market matched sample of control firms in the same industry as the outsourcing firm. The empirical results provide strong support for all three hypotheses. Relative to a risk matched sample of control firms in the industry, the mean three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the fixed price portfolio is 17.5% (p < 0 05). Similarly, after performance attribution to the Fama and French factors ( Fama and French 1993) , the three-year implied return for the fixed price portfolio following the implementation of the contract is 48.3% (p < 0 01). The large positive long-term abnormal returns suggest that firms who outsourced relatively simple and stable tasks gained significant shareholder value relative to similar firms in the same industry that chose not to externalize such tasks during the same time period. The returns are consistent with changes in operational performance of the outsourcing firms, implying that the market was slow to react to the efficiency benefits of fixed price contracts. For variable price contracts, the overall mean three-year BHAR is −21 2% (p < 0 10), implying that overall, firms engaging in complex, dynamic outsourcing engagements lost significant shareholder value. However, multivariate analysis shows that prior association with the vendor and outsourcing experience positively moderate long-term returns to variable price contracts. Variable price engagements where the outsourcing firm shared a prior association with the vendor outperformed those without such association by a three-year BHAR of 51% (p < 0 10). Similarly, variable price contracts in the highest triad of outsourcing experience realized 64% (p < 0 05) higher BHAR than those in the lowest triad.
Our study contributes to both the theory and practice of outsourcing. First, although there is substantial IS literature on contract choice in outsourcing as well as the decision to outsource, the literature on the impact of outsourcing on shareholder value is in its nascent stages. Prior research in this space has primarily focused on announcement period returns. We develop a framework to test rather than accept market efficiency in pricing large outsourcing decisions. Our results provide empirical evidence of potential mispricing 3 of such events during the announcement period, and underscore the need to adopt a longterm perspective in estimating the shareholder value of large outsourcing decisions in future research. Further, prior research has largely focused on tangible information on firm attributes such as liquidity or leverage that is obtained from the firm's accounting statements or on engagement attributes such as contract value that is obtained from the outsourcing announcement; yet, there is little theory linking these variables to contract choice or performance. There is mixed evidence in the extant literature to the pricing of a common set of these attributes (e.g., both positive and negative market response to outsourcing initiatives with a strategic intent versus cost reduction), suggesting that the markets may be responding to other factors. Our long-term perspective allows for the inclusion of intangible information on the contract, task, business, or relational characteristics that are considered important theoretical antecedents to outsourcing success in the institutional economics and strategy literature. Finally, our finding on the moderating impact of prior association and outsourcing experience on long-term returns to dynamic, complex outsourcing initiatives has implications for firms facing the decision to outsource. We emphasize that market outcomes of undertaking complex initiatives may not be intrinsically positive or negative, but that success hinges on certain critical factors. The theory and results involving returns to variable price contracts across high and low levels of experience and with and without prior vendor association highlight the potential danger of loss of shareholder value from undertaking complex initiatives without the capabilities to deal with allied risks and challenges. Regardless of how the market may price a large, complex event during the announcement period, the long-term shareholder value depends on whether the firm has the capabilities to handle the ensuing challenges.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the extant literature on market reactions to outsourcing announcements. The theory and hypotheses are developed in 3, and §4 describes the data collection and analyses. Results are presented in 5, and discussions and conclusion are provided in §6.
Market Reaction to Outsourcing
Announcements: Prior Literature
The extant literature, 4 summarized in Table 1 , has investigated market reactions to characteristics of the (i) outsourced contract (size and duration); (ii) task (labor intensity, restructuring requirements); (iii) firm (size, opacity, flexibility, prior performance); (iv) vendor (relative size); and (v) outsourcing objective (e.g., strategic or cost cutting). All but three market reaction studies (Peak et al. 2002 , Florin et al. 2005 , Gao 2006 have investigated announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The overall findings are mixed, ranging from negative to positive impacts, and are often not in agreement with each other. For example, in analyzing market reactions to contract size, Gurbaxani (2005) , Oh et al. (2006) , and Gao (2006) report significant positive, negative, and no association, respectively. Whereas Farag and Krishnan (2003) find negative returns to cost cutting initiatives, Oh et al. (2006) and Beasley et al. (2009) report that cost reduction or efficiency focused outsourcing initiatives had a positive market response. Similarly, conflicting market reactions to prior efficiency and financial weakness are reported in Loh and Venkatraman (1992) , Beasley et al. (2009), and Peak et al. (2002) .
only discuss studies on market reaction to outsourcing announcements. Lacity et al. (2009) provide an excellent and extensive review of the IS outsourcing literature.
There has been little research to theoretically reconcile these conflicting findings regarding short-term market reactions. Could these opposing results be indicative of market inefficiency? In using announcement period returns to provide evidence of creation or loss of shareholder value, these studies implicitly assume the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which posits that at any given time, the stock price of a firm reflects all publicly available information, and, in turn, the collective belief of investors regarding future prospects of the firm. However, we argue that the market may not be efficient in pricing large outsourcing events that involve major changes to the firm's value chain.
The literature on market myopia Titman 1997, 2006; Eberhart et al. 2004 ) distinguishes between tangible and intangible information, which is described as the difference between explicit measures of past performance such as sales or cash flow information that can be observed from the firm's accounting statements and the "orthogonal" component of information about future performance, which is unrelated to past accounting performance. Daniel and Titman (2006) (Daniel and Titman 2006) . We suggest that although outsourcing announcements are explicit about direct costs, the benefits of an outsourcing decision reflect intangible information on future cash flows. As a consequence, markets will be imprecise in interpreting and pricing major outsourcing events.
Inefficient pricing of intangible information on outsourcing initiatives stems from costs of acquiring and learning such information. The outsourcing firm may not have the incentive to disclose detailed information about the event for competitive reasons. Further, outsourcing initiatives involve significant uncertainty in payoffs. Disclosure of revision to payoffs communicated ex ante may result in an adverse reaction from the markets, thereby providing disincentive for disclosure about expected challenges or benefits. Finally, the outsourcing firm itself may not initially recognize the scope of changes and managerial challenges involved in ensuring success of the event . Not surprisingly, information such as complexity of coordination requirements, volatility in business requirements, prior association with the vendor, experience and expertise of the client firm in managing large outsourcing initiatives, etc., is seldom disclosed in the outsourcing announcement or available in accounting statements. Yet, these factors may significantly impact the realization of expected payoffs. In the absence of detailed disclosure, the market incurs a high cost of acquiring such information.
Further, even if such information is acquired, the market incurs learning costs to interpret the information and infer possible outcomes for the outsourcing decision (Daniel and Titman 2006) . For example, what are the coordination requirements of the outsourcing engagement? Will the client succeed in assessing and implementing the coordination needs involving technological and process changes both within its own organization as well as in the vendor firm? Given that the challenges may not be fully discernible in the early stages of the engagement, the response of financial markets to outsourcing decisions may be slow, incomplete, or even biased.
Over time, the market incorporates information on complexity of the BPO relationship and governance capabilities into the stock price of the outsourcing firm in two ways. First, markets may learn to discern complexity of the outsourcing initiative and recognize capabilities that drive value (e.g., prior association between the client and vendor, and prior experience in managing outsourcing relationships, among others). Second, the market may price only the observed operational performance gains that result from having the right governance capabilities in place. To that extent, the market underestimates the value of these capabilities when the outsourcing contract is announced; the market is inefficient in pricing these capabilities, resulting in long-term BHAR to the outsourcing contracts. For these reasons, in contrast to short horizon studies that assume market efficiency, we adopt a long-term approach to estimating the market value of outsourcing that tests market efficiency (Kothari and Warner 2007) .
The three long-term returns studies by Peak et al. (2002) , Florin et al. (2005) , and Gao (2006) represent important advances in our understanding of market reactions to outsourcing events. Gao (2006) finds large positive long-term BHAR (27.84% p < 0 01) from outsourcing, and Peak et al. (2002) also report positive long-term abnormal returns. These results open up a vista of opportunities for additional research. Given that these studies deployed variables such as client size, contract size, relative size of vendor to client, opacity, flexibility, and financial weakness--which are available either from the outsourcing announcement itself or prior accounting statements-why did the market price the same event differently in the long run? That is, could there be other factors that the market did not know of or consider in the short run? For example, Florin et al. (2005) find insignificant overall long-term CAR, 5 but observe a significant negative reaction for announcements followed by large organizational restructuring initiatives. However, they do not consider whether some firms are able to better manage such restructuring efforts than others, and still realize a positive reaction from the market. Thus the sparse literature on long-term reactions to outsourcing events provides many interesting research avenues.
Contract choice has long been considered in institutional economics and strategy as a key element of governance that drives outsourcing success (see Dibbern et al. 2004 3. Theory and Hypotheses Development 3.1. A Business Uncertainty, Coordination Requirements, and Contract Choice Research on outsourcing has focused on choosing the right contract structure, which is largely categorized as either fixed or variable price (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998 , Banerjee and Duflo 2000 , Gopal et al. 2003 .
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Fixed price contracts involve payment of a fixed price either per billing cycle when the outsourced output is indivisible (e.g., software development) or per transaction per billing cycle when the output comprises a variable number of transactions (e.g., claims processed, calls fielded). Variable price contracts, also known as time and materials or cost plus contracts, involve payment based on variable factors, often the time and effort expended in task execution.
Early empirical research in contract choice (e.g., Crocker and Reynolds 1993) finds that intrinsic to the choice of a fixed or variable price contract is the selection of the degree of completeness. Fixed price contracts are more complete than variable price contracts, with compensation being independent of future contingencies, and not subject to ex post revisions based on the provider's cost experience. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) find that firms self-select contractual completeness to minimize the trade-off between ex ante costs of contract design and ex post inefficiencies of contractual incompleteness such as investment distortions, costly bargaining, or private favorable distribution of ex post surplus. Thus, they conclude that attributes of the outsourcing initiative that increase uncertainty in the contracting environment and allied costs of contract design should result in efficient contracts being less complete. However, attributes of the engagement that exacerbate the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and the potential for 7 Informal or relational contracting based on trust has been found to be complementary to formal contracting (Poppo and Zenger 2002) . We find a similar result in our study with market reaction as the dependent variable.
ex post inefficiencies should result in efficient contracts being more complete. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) assume that fixed price contracts are truly complete agreements with no ex post costs in task execution for the vendor. By contrast, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) find that fixed price contracts are never truly complete; overruns occur in both fixed and variable price contracts with the central trade-off involving containment of subsequent opportunism by participant firms. This finding is consistent with Bajari and Tadelis (2001) , who note that the firm incurs a cost of contractually specifying the outsourced task, and is faced with the trade-off between providing incentives and reducing ex post costs of costly renegotiation. Thus when the outsourced engagement is more complex or when there is high uncertainty in the business environment leading to unforeseen contingencies and difficulty in specification and measurement of outsourced activities, variable price is preferred to fixed price contracts.
Although the above school of studies largely focuses on incentive conflicts in the relationship, later research on contract choice extends this focus to emphasize cognitive conflict and issues of coordination between firms. Yang (2001) recognizes the trade-off between coordination failures in networks of division of labor and costs of contractual specification and concludes that more complex engagements involving greater coordination are more likely to be governed by variable price contracts. Similarly, Gulati and Singh (1998) argue that the level of interdependence anticipated between the participant firms determines the coordination levels in the outsourcing initiative. At higher levels of interdependence, 8 contingencies are hypothetical and often depend on the action of the provider and the latter's accurate interpretation and timely responsiveness to the outsourcing firm's own actions. In such a case, it is costly to contractually specify a precise division of labor and responsibilities. Therefore, complexity of coordination associated with higher levels of interdependence will result in more incomplete variable price contracts.
In relatively simple, stable environments that underlie fixed price contracts, the ownership and control of the outsourced task may be transferred to the Information Systems Research 24(4), pp. 1028 -1049 , © 2013 vendor through an arms length contract that also serves as the primary instrument of coordination. However, complex outsourcing engagements that are associated with the choice of variable price contracts involve greater risks of cost overruns, opportunistic behavior, and coordination failures. There are limits to mitigate these risks through contracting (Banerjee and Duflo 2000) , and outsourcing firms must often invest in appropriate coordination mechanisms that complement the contract to foster trust and counteract the problems created by the limitations of contracting (Poppo and Zenger 2002) . Mani et al. (2012) note that the allocation of risks and incentives in variable price contracts requires high levels of information exchange and coordination between the outsourcing firm and the provider. They demonstrate that such contractual structure must be accompanied by joint action, relational emphasis on coordination, and investment in technological capabilities to be successful. Organizations outsourcing complex business functions often underinvest in structures, processes and technologies for communication, coordination, and collaboration, resulting in lower client satisfaction and operational efficiency ).
Given the above differences in incompleteness, risks, and incentives between fixed and variable price contracts, we expect that these two contract choices involve different capabilities and have different performance impacts. In particular, we theorize that familiarity with the vendor and learning associated with prior experience render it easier to handle higher levels of information exchange and coordination associated with variable price contracts. However, in fixed price contracts, the allocation of risks and incentives requires lower levels of coordination between the outsourcing firm and the provider. Further, given the relatively simpler nature of the underlying task and the relatively greater completeness of the contract, the fixed price contract serves as the primary coordination mechanism in fixed price engagements. Therefore, in this case, we expect prior association and experience to have little impact on value created through outsourcing; we only theorize about the overall value created in fixed price contracts relative to firms that did not outsource. The It is important to note that the contract itself is not a driver of the value created through outsourcing; rather, different contract choices in our model are indicative of different levels of complexity and coordination requirements of the underlying task, and in turn, different management capabilities required for value creation through outsourcing. For this reason, through the study, we focus on the value created by outsourcing firms relative to risk adjusted competition that did not outsource rather than on the difference in value created for the same outsourced task under different contractual regimes.
The above thesis of our study is summarized in Figure 1 . Our hypotheses regarding the performance impacts of outsourcing and the drivers of such performance gains are outlined below.
Fixed Price Contracts and Long-Term
Abnormal Returns Investments in coordination mechanisms, processes, and technologies are necessary only in the presence of significant hazards (Poppo and Zenger 2002) . Given high-powered incentives, relatively stable business requirements, and lower levels of interdependence between the outsourcing firm and the provider, the execution of the outsourced task is specified more easily in the fixed price outsourcing contract and its performance more easily measured (Mani et al. 2012) . As a consequence, in fixed price engagements, the ownership and control of the outsourced task are often transferred to the vendor, and the need for coordination between the outsourcing firm and the provider is limited. To the contrary, investments and commitment of resources to extensive coordination and relationship management are often detrimental to efficiency gains in these contracts (Mani et al. 2012) . The contract serves, not only as an effective mode of control to align incentives, but also as an effective coordination mechanism to facilitate shared understanding and align actions. Given the relatively lower transaction costs that characterize fixed price contracts, we expect that firms, in not outsourcing simple tasks in relatively stable environments, are likely to forgo an opportunity to derive significant efficiency gains. However, the market is unlikely to incorporate Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 .2] on 16 November 2014, at 02:23 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
this intangible information in the stock price of the outsourcing firm at the time of announcement of the initiative, resulting in a delayed response to the event. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis (H1). Outsourcing engagements governed by a fixed price contract are associated with positive longterm abnormal returns relative to similar firms that did not outsource.
The Role of Prior Association in
Variable Price Contracts We noted earlier that outsourcing engagements governed by variable price contracts are dynamic and involve more complex coordination requirements relative to engagements governed by fixed price contracts. Dynamic business requirements render it difficult to contractually specify the outsourced task and performance, engendering appropriation concerns and the frequent need to deal with risky, unforeseen contingencies. Further, anticipated interdependence between the firms is also high in variable price contracts, necessitating higher levels of coordination between participant firms to develop a shared understanding of the outsourced task and facilitate task execution.
We argue that prior association between the outsourcing firm and the vendor helps address the above appropriation and coordination concerns in the outsourcing relationship. Social exchange theory (e.g., Blau 1964) emphasizes that trust plays a vital role in social exchanges because of the risk of free riding, and helps engender reciprocity in actions over time (Das and Teng 2002) . Das and Teng (2002) argue that "social exchanges play a central role in inter-firm alliances, which are characterized by incomplete contracts and reciprocal exchanges of resources," (p. 448). Barua and Ravindran (1996) demonstrate how reciprocal and cooperative behavior in information sharing between different groups emerges in a scenario characterized by continuity of the relationship and a long-term focus. In the context of an outsourcing relationship, we can therefore expect higher levels of cooperation and trust in settings where a client and a vendor have prior association. Relational capital and allied trust that stems from prior association mitigates concerns of moral hazard and privately favorable distribution of surplus (Chang and Gotcher 2008, Balakrishnan and Koza 1993) .
Prior research in strategy (e.g., Dyer and Singh 1998 , Lane and Lubatkin 1998 , Kale et al. 2000 ) offers a complementary perspective on the role of relational capital in mitigating coordination costs. These studies suggest that the strength of relational capital between partner firms, which increases with the length of the relationship, facilitates interfirm learning. Prior association with a vendor enables each partner to better understand the other's work routines and processes. Greater competence in transacting with each other that accompanies relational learning helps build greater domain consensus between the outsourcing firm and provider, reduce information processing costs, and manage collaborative activities more efficiently over time (Anand and Khanna 2000, Gulati 1995) . Therefore, prior association helps firms coordinate behavior and interdependencies to achieve an integrated response to changes in their environment (Levine and White 1961, Gulati et al. 2005) . Further, the costs of contracting are lowered, as the memory or knowledge of the provider's behavior and actions helps the client better predict appropriation concerns and specify contingent actions, rights, and responsibilities (Gulati and Singh 1998) . As stated earlier, the market is unlikely to obtain and/or interpret information on such nuances in the short run. Hence, for engagements governed by variable price contracts we posit the following:
Hypothesis (H2). Prior association with the vendor has a positive impact on long-term abnormal returns in outsourcing engagements governed by variable price contracts.
The Role of Experience in
Variable Price Contracts Another form of learning that may also be pertinent to managing appropriation and coordination concerns in variable price contracts is experiential learning or "learning by doing." Mayer and Argyres (2004) emphasize the importance of experience in managing outsourcing relationships, which results in modifications to the contractual structure that are not fully explained by changes in the task or allied risks. They conclude that firms learn about contingencies and hazards slowly and incrementally as they experience them, and are thus able to better foresee contingencies and their performance implications in future contractual relationships. Learning through experience is not just limited to a dyadic relationship. A client firm may learn to better manage complex engagements from the experience of managing a portfolio of similar interfirm strategic alliances. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) observe that a diverse background characterized by a repertoire of experiences provides a robust basis for learning because it increases the likelihood that the information encountered by the firm relates to what is already known, and in turn, the likelihood of finding a potentially useful solution. Similarly, Bower and Hilgard (1981) suggest that the greater the number of stored instances in an individual's memory, the easier it is to learn from new experiences. Thus, the greater the prior experience of the outsourcing firm, the easier it may be to interpret and respond to unforeseen contingencies in subsequent outsourcing engagements. Anand and Khanna (2000) Repeated exposure to similar alliances and exchanges allows for wider specification of contingencies and responses, and enhances ex post adaptation by facilitating interpretation and response to unforeseen contingencies. Better knowledge of outsourcing procedures through experience also helps the outsourcing firm identify appropriate relational processes and technologies that enhance its information processing capabilities to better coordinate actions with the provider. Hence we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis (H3). Experience in outsourcing management has a positive impact on long-term abnormal returns in outsourcing engagements governed by variable price contracts.
Empirical Analyses

Data Collection
Our empirical analysis is based on the 100 largest outsourcing initiatives (by total contract value) implemented between 1996 and 2005. The largest outsourcing contracts have important advantages over a similar random sample. First, the firm-level economic impact of outsourcing is more likely to be detected when the contract value is large. The average lifetime contract value in our sample is $922 million. The aggregate contract value of $83 billion represents approximately 18% of the total outsourcing contract value for the sample period. Second, our focus on large deals reduces the probability of confounding events; firms are less likely to sign as large contracts immediately prior or subsequent to the outsourcing agreement. Our approach to sample selection follows prior research in financial economics (e.g., Healy et al. 1992 ) that examines the performance impact of other firm boundary decisions such as mergers or acquisitions.
The data set draws on multiple sources. Information on the 100 largest outsourcing initiatives and their governing contracts is obtained from International Data Corporation's services contracts database. IDC tracks outsourcing contracts signed around the world with the database comprising more than 14,000 service contracts. As outsourcing began to gain momentum and contract value began to increase, IDC began to offer a detailed look at the top 100 outsourcing contracts each year, ranked by total contract value. This data dates back to 1996, and is the primary input to this study. IDC data on the top 100 outsourcing contracts signed each year includes contract value, length, announcement and signing date, geography, industry, outsourcing type, and a detailed description of the service provided. We use Lexis-Nexis and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service to verify and supplement IDC information on announcement and signing dates. Company data from COMPUSTAT and SDC Platinum and stock price data from CRSP complements the contract data.
We begin with a sample of 1,000 outsourcing contracts spanning the period 1996-2005. This initial sample comprises public, private, and government contracts signed in nearly 30 countries. Our final sample comprises the 100 largest outsourcing contracts that satisfy two requirements. First, the firm must be publicly traded on a major U.S. stock exchange. Second, information on the contract used to govern the outsourcing initiative must be available. Our final sample of 100 contracts includes 66 firms. 
where mt denotes the corresponding daily returns to the value weighted S&P 500. An estimation period of 150 days [−170 −21] prior to the announcement date is used to estimate the market model. Significance of the returns is based on the market model standardized residual method with Scholes-Williams betas (Scholes and Williams 1977) . The estimates from this model are then used to predict daily returns for each firm i over a two day period [−1 0] surrounding the announcement of the outsourcing initiative.
Event-Time Abnormal Stock
Returns. The firm's decision to outsource is often followed by selection of potential vendors, competitive bidding among vendors and evaluation of submitted proposals, and choice of the vendor. Thus, information on the outsourcing initiative is likely incorporated into the stock price ahead of the announcement date. We begin measuring long-term abnormal stock returns at the beginning of the month following the effective date of the contract. We use the month lag to allow the market to be informed of contract characteristics and other accounting data. We use two main methods for estimating post-event risk adjusted returns-characteristic based matching approach, also known as the event-time portfolio approach, and the Jensen's alpha approach, also known as the calendar-time portfolio approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) describe event-time buyand-hold abnormal return as "the average multi-year return from a strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a prespecified holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms," (p. 296). Thus, the BHAR for stock i over holding period T is
where BHR i T is the buy-and-hold return of the sample firm and BHR m T is the buy-and-hold return of the matching control firm over the same period. Here, the buy-and-hold return for holding period T beginning time a through time b is
where r it is the return for firm i in month t; in this study, period a is the month after the contract effective month and period b is the earlier of the firm's delisting date, the end of the three-year period following the contract effective date or December 31, 2006. Following Barber and Lyon (1997) , we consider an industry-, size-and book-to-market matched sample as a benchmark of returns post implementation of the outsourcing contract. We begin with a group of firms in the same two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code as the sample that do not engage in a strategically significant outsourcing initiative as of the beginning of the contract effective year. From this initial screen, a matched firm is defined as the firm that has the lowest absolute value of the joint difference in size (equity capitalization) and marketto-book ratio (equity capitalization divided by book value of equity).
4.2.3. Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns. Certain studies (Fama 1998, Mitchell and Stafford 2000) argue that measures of BHAR are more likely to spuriously reject market efficiency because they magnify underperformance through compounding singleperiod returns. Further, the use of BHARs does not adequately account for potential cross-sectional dependence in returns, thereby resulting in biased estimates. To address these possibilities with eventtime BHARs, we also estimate abnormal returns using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model:
where R pt is the excess return to a stock p in calendar month t, R ft is the risk-free interest rate, R mt is the CRSP value-weighted market index return, SMB t is the difference in returns between a portfolio of "small" and "big" stocks, and HML t is the difference in returns between a portfolio of "high" and "low" book-to-market stocks. A sample stock is included in calendar month t if t is within the 36-month period following the implementation of its contract. The expected value of the intercept ( ) in the above equation measures the monthly abnormal return in excess of that achieved by passive investments in the factors; it is zero under the null hypothesis of market efficiency. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
4.2.4. Operational Performance. We measure abnormal operating performance as the sample firm's raw operating performance minus its industry, size, and book-to-market matched firm's raw operating performance. Our measures of raw operating performance include sales efficiency (sales divided by number of employees) and income efficiency (earnings before interest and taxes divided by number of employees). We estimate abnormal operating performance of the sample firms in eventand calendar time. Further, we estimate the sample firms' abnormal operating performance for the year prior to the contract effective year and for each of the three years following the effective year. Comparing the post-outsourcing performance to the pre-outsourcing benchmark provides a measure of change in abnormal operating performance.
4.2.5. Contract Choice. IDC classifies outsourcing contracts as one of fixed price or transactional, time and materials, or a combination of variable and fixed price components. For instance, in a custom application development project, the outsourcing firm may negotiate a fixed price contract during the assessment of project requirements and shift to a variable price contract such as time and materials during the actual development phase. We do not consider equity arrangements such as joint ventures, the outsourcing firm's wholly owned captive operation, or the establishment of a venture by a consortium of vendors. We refer to the set of combination and time and materials contracts as variable price contracts. Table 2 , panel A, lists the distribution of our sample across primary SIC codes. The distribution indicates some clustering; to address potential bias arising 9 Managers in the outsourcing firm noted that combination contracts largely start as time and materials compensation and progress to fixed price compensation after the provider has acquired a more sound understanding of the outsourced task requirements. Thus, in the three-year period following the implementation of the contract, we group combination contracts with time and materials contracts. Scholes-Williams (1977) betas. Wealth effects or the dollar change in wealth is computed by multiplying each user firm's market value of equity by its anouncement period abnormal return and then averaging the product across the user firms in the sample.
Summary Statistics
from industry clusters, we report industry adjusted BHAR. Also included is the sample distribution across outsourcing types. Outsourcing initiatives in the sample are classified as information systems (IS) outsourcing; business process outsourcing (BPO) or processing services; and application, network and desktop management. In the case of IS outsourcing services, the service provider takes ownership of and responsibility for managing all or a large part of a client's IS infrastructure and operations, often involving customized, one-to-one engagements. If only the network and desktop environment are outsourced, IDC captures the spending in the network management services and desktop management services category. Likewise, if only the application environment is outsourced, IDC captures the spending in the applications outsourcing category. Applications outsourcing is a service wherein responsibility for deployment, management, and enhancement of a packaged or customized software application is externalized to the provider. Applications outsourcers also include application service providers (ASPs). ASPs deploy, host, manage, and rent access to an application from a centrally managed facility. Network management services involve the outsourcing of the operations of a specific segment or entire network communication system of a company. The network operations provided as part of a larger IS outsourcing contract are not captured in this category. Desktop management captures contracts for which several desktop services are outsourced to the same provider. Processing services involve outsourcing of activities with performance metrics tied to the efficiency of high-volume service capabilities. BPO involves outsourcing business processes or functional areas (such as logistics or HR), with performance metrics tied to the strategic business value of services provided and to customer satisfaction. Business value is recognized through results such as new business opportunities, revenue generation, and business transformation. IS outsourcing contracts constitute 53% of the sample; BPO and processing services comprise 27%; and application, network and desktop management contracts comprise 20% of the sample. Number of outsourcing contracts the contract implementation year, the mean (median) market value of equity of our sample firms is $37.3 ($23.8) billion. The mean (median) market to book ratio is 3.27 (2.71). Thus the sample is skewed toward large, high market-to-book firms. We control for these effects in our analysis. On average, the IS outsourcing contract in our sample is valued at $1.1 billion; the BPO contract is valued at $703 million; and the application, network, and desktop management contract is valued at $747 million. Gartner's analysis of IT outsourcing contracts over a period of 14 years found that as of 2003, the average annual value of an outsourcing contract was $47 million. A comparison with this estimate emphasizes the strategic import of our sample contracts. Figure 2 shows the number and value of the sample outsourcing contracts. More than 40% of these outsourcing contracts were signed in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] . Total contract value for the period 2001-2005 accounted for more than 50% of the aggregate contract value for the sample period. Figure 3 suggests that fixed price contracts constitute 30% of our sample. The average contract value of the fixed price contracts is $826 million and that of variable price contracts is $834 million. (2000) and Fama (1998) argue that estimates of abnormal returns may be biased if factor model estimates of expected returns are incomplete in measuring risks. Studies in finance (Eberhart et al. 2004 ) address the above issues by examining the robustness of results to alternative measures. Therefore, we use both calendar-time and event-time returns in our estimation. We note that these methods are biased in favor of the EMH; because the bulk of our results still reject the EMH, any possible bias of these methods in favor of the EMH only strengthens our results. Our use of calendar-time returns and our long sample period also address any possible concern that the results are driven by brief calendar periods where firms that just happen to implement fixed price contracts do abnormally well. Further, in order to examine whether the equity value gains from fixed price contracts are from real economic gains that the market underestimates and not simply capital market inefficiencies or chance, we report the median abnormal operating performance for the fixed price portfolio following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. This approach is consistent with studies in finance (Eberhart et al. 2004 ) on the financial impact of strategic information events. Finally, we perform robustness checks to ensure that the results are not influenced by prior performance of the firm.
We regress the above BHAR on a variety of firm and relational characteristics including prior association between the outsourcing firm and vendor and outsourcing experience. The above estimation of abnormal returns is consistent with the view in the finance literature that systematic risk is the only significant predictor of abnormal returns. However, theories of firm boundaries suggest that firms self-select into strategic decisions based on various idiosyncratic factors that may also impact abnormal returns. Our failure to correct for these factors may result Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 (Heckman 1979) . The first stage relationship of our Heckman two-stage model estimates a model of contract choice as a function of several variables that shift the relative costs and benefits of fixed price contracts: P Y it = 1 = X i ), where Y it represents the contract choice for firm i in date t, X i is a vector of the relationship-, transaction-and firm-level characteristics that determine contract choice, is a vector of estimated coefficients for these characteristics, and · is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The second stage of the Heckman model estimates the effect of firm and relational characteristics, including prior association and outsourcing experience on abnormal returns in both contracts. Petersen (2009) , in his simulation of analytical methods in corporate finance, finds that when both firm and time effects are present, standard errors clustered on both dimensions are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals. The fixed and random effect specifications also produce unbiased standard errors but only when the firm effect is permanent. Thus, we estimate the following:
where C ic represents the contract type chosen by firm i in outsourcing contract c, X ic is a vector of firm attributes, Z ic is a vector of transactional attributes, and M ic is a vector of relational attributes. Given potential firm and time effects, we cluster standard errors on both firm and year of implementation of the contract. 10 The operationalization of all variables used in our analyses is detailed in Table 3 .
Results
Announcement Period Abnormal
Stock Returns Following prior research, we report the mean two-day [−1 0] announcement period return for our sample of outsourcing contracts. The mean two-day announcement period return across our sample of contracts is an insignificant −0 11%. The equivalent estimate for fixed price engagements was −0 86% (p < 0 05) and that for variable contracts was an insignificant 0.43%. Our results are consistent with that of Farag and Krishnan (2003) who find that outsourcing initiatives, which focus on cost reduction, are characterized by significant negative announcement period returns. However, the use of announcement period returns assumes market efficiency; a comparison with long-term abnormal returns is necessary to test the efficiency of the market in responding to the outsourcing event:
Systematically nonzero abnormal security returns that persist after a particular type of corporate event are inconsistent with market efficiency. Accordingly, event studies focusing on long-horizons following an event can provide key evidence on market efficiency (Kothari and Warner 2007, p. 5) Table 4 , panel A, reports three-year BHAR for all sample outsourcing firms following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. Panel B reports BHAR for outsourcing firms that implemented contracts between 1996 and 2003-all three years' return data exist for these firms. The mean three-year BHAR for the fixed price portfolio relative to an industry-, size-and book-to-market matched control portfolio is 17.5% (p < 0 05) and the corresponding estimate for the variable price portfolio is −21 2% (p < 0 10). Thus, the fixed price portfolio significantly outperformed the variable price portfolio in the sample period. The results in Table 4 , panel B, suggest that estimates in Table 4 , panel A, underestimate the costs (benefits) of variable (fixed) price contracts. The mean three-year BHAR for the fixed and variable price portfolios for which all three years' price data exist are 23.6% (p < 0 05) and −32 7% (p < 0 05), respectively. Indeed, the market is inefficient in its valuation of outsourcing contracts. Taken together with the results for the announcement period returns, the long-term abnormal returns to fixed price contracts suggest that the market significantly underestimated the benefits to these contracts when the outsourcing initiative was announced. The results for the fixed price portfolio provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Table 4 , panel C, reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns after attribution to the Fama and French (1993) factors.
Event-Time Abnormal Stock Returns
Calendar-Time Abnormal Stock Returns
11 The first row of panel C provide results for estimation of calendar time stock 11 Fama and French (1993) suggest that higher returns to high book-to-market and small capitalization firms are compensation for higher systematic risk. Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest the returns are an outcome of investor biases. Daniel and Titman (1997) also posit that the higher returns are not directly associated with pervasive risk factors; rather, they are explained by similar firm characteristics in the portfolio of high book-to-market firms. We do not take a position in this debate and view the factors only as a method of performance attribution. 
IDC, Compustat
Firm attributes UNCERTAINTY Uncertainty in business requirements of the outsourcing firm Variance in the outsourcing firm's return on assets (RoA) over the three years prior to the contract effective year. RoA is defined as the ratio of operating income (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM OPITI) to total assets (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM AT).
Compustat
EXP
Outsourcing experience
The cumulative number of strategic alliances across a firm's life served as a proxy for the depth of its outsourcing experience. We also used the number of outsourcing relationships recorded in the IDC database to estimate the experience of the outsourcing firm. The results were largely consistent with the previous measure.
SDC Platinum, IDC
SIZE
Market value of equity of the outsourcing firm
Market value of equity, defined as the product of the number of shares outstanding (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM CSHO) and market price (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM PRCC_C).
Compustat
BTM
Book-to-market ratio of the outsourcing firm
Ratio of book value of equity (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM BKVLPS x CSHO) to market value of equity of the outsourcing firm (SIZE above).
Compustat
CASH
Short-term cash needs of the outsourcing firm
Cash and cash equivalents (average of COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMs CHEB, CHEE) as a ratio of net sales (COMPUSTAT DATA ITEM SALE).
Compustat
MKTLEV
Market leverage of the outsourcing firm
Ratio of market value of debt to total market value of firm. Compustat
BKLEV
Book leverage of the outsourcing firm
Ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt) (sum of COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMs DLTT, LCT) to book value of equity as calculated above. The results are also robust to the estimation of debt as total assets less common stockholders equity.
Compustat
OPEX
Operating expenses of the outsourcing firm
Total of cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses as a ratio of net sales. Implied 3-year AR (%) −10 26
Notes. Panel A reports buy-and-hold returns for the sample firms, and BHAR for the sample firms relative to control firms, for the three-year period following the date the outsourcing contract was signed. Panel B reports BHAR for sample firms where return data for all three years is available. Panel C provides long-term abnormal stock returns from calendar-time portfolio regressions where the dependent variables are event portfolio returns in calendar month t, R pt , in excess of the Treasury bill rate, R ft . The three performance attribution factors from Fama and French (1993) are the excess returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index, R m − R f , the difference in returns between portfolios of "small" and "big" stocks, SMB, and the difference in returns between portfolios of "high" and "low" book-to-market socks, HML. The intercept, , measures the monthly abnormal return. The implied three-year abnormal return [(1 + Intercept) 36 − 1], the estimated average buy-and-hold return resulting from earning the intercept return every month for 36 months, is a significant 48% for transactions involving fixed price contracts and an insignificant −10% for outsourcing transactions involving variable price contracts. Thus, the return on the fixed price portfolio is nearly five times that earned on the variable price portfolio. T -statistics reported in parantheses are all heteroscedasticity consistent. * p < 0 10, * * p < 0 05, * * * p < 0 01.
returns in excess of the risk free rate for the entire sample of outsourcing contracts and the latter two rows provide corresponding estimates for the fixed and variable price portfolios, respectively. The regression intercepts indicate that fixed price outsourcing engagements earned average abnormal returns of 1.1% per month (p < 0 01) over the three-year period following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. This translates to a three-year return of over 48% 1 + 0 011 36 − 1 . The significant intercept provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. The corresponding estimate for variable price contracts is an insignificant −10%.
Therefore, we find that the announcement period returns to fixed price contracts change direction over the long term. The results for short-and long-term returns reject the hypothesis of market efficiency, and confirm that the market underestimated the positive impact of relatively more complete fixed price contracts at the time of the outsourcing announcement.
Outsourcing Contracts and Long-Term
Operating Performance To determine whether the equity value gains to fixed price contracts are from real economic gains that the market underestimates and not simply capital market inefficiencies, we report the median abnormal operating performance for the fixed price portfolio following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. The median abnormal sales efficiency estimates for the three years following the implementation of the outsourcing contract are $85.8 per employee, $90.1 per employee, and $94.7 per employee. These represent an increase of 33%, 40%, and 47%, respectively, over the year preceding the implementation of the contract. The median abnormal income efficiency measures for Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 .2] on 16 November 2014, at 02:23 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. the three years following the implementation of the outsourcing contract are $14.5 per employee, $15.3 per employee, and $14 per employee. These estimates represent an increase of over 200% over the year preceding the implementation of the contract. The results for significant positive abnormal operating performance are robust to alternative industry performance and profit margins matched samples.
12 Eberhart et al. (2004) note that the statistical concerns of clustering and cross-sectional correlations that apply to estimation of event time returns are also pertinent to operating performance measures. Thus, we also compute abnormal operating performance of firms in the fixed price portfolio in calendar time.
For each calendar year, we estimate the abnormal operating performance for each sample firm that has implemented a fixed price contract in the preceding five years. Following prior research (e.g., Barber and Lyon 1996, Loughran and Ritter 1997), we compute the median abnormal operating performance for each calendar year. The abnormal operating performance for the fixed price portfolio is computed as the time series average of these annual abnormal performance measures and the standard error is computed as the time series volatility of these annual measures. The abnormal sales efficiency measure for the fixed price portfolio is $91.2 per employee (p < 0 01) and the abnormal income efficiency measure is $22.5 per employee (p < 0 10). The equivalent mean estimates are $147.1 per employee (p < 0 01) and $26.86 per employee (p < 0 01). The estimates of event time and calendar time abnormal operating performance confirm that the market underestimates efficiency benefits of fixed price contracts at the time of implementation of the contract.
Robustness Checks
We perform multiple robustness checks to examine whether superior returns to fixed price contracts are correlated with exogenous firm characteristics. First, we check whether pre-event performance measures 12 Large-scale outsourcing contracts often involve the transfer of assets and employees to the vendor. This is especially true of fixed price contracts, where control and ownership of the outsourced task is transferred to the vendor. Such asset transfer involves conversion of capital expenditures to operating expenses (OPEX) and is accompanied by a reduction in headcount. Increase in OPEX and reduction in headcount decrease and increase income efficiency estimates, respectively. Therefore, the overall impact of such asset transfer on income efficiency is indeterminate and not controlled for in our analyses. Notwithstanding asset transfer, the impact of outsourcing on long-term operational performance, including longterm sales and income efficiency, is positive only if the engagement is successful. Else, assets and resources must be brought back in-house or reinvested in, resulting in an erosion of long-term efficiency gains. We find that fixed price contracts yield long-term efficiency gains and that the market underestimates the impact of these gains at the time of announcement of the initiative. explain differences in the BHAR. A comparison of pre-event returns across both contracts finds that the mean and median raw returns for firms engaging in fixed price contracts is not significantly different from those with variable price contracts. Further, for both contracts, the mean raw buy-and-hold returns are lower than the mean contemporaneous buy-and-hold returns for the industry-, size-and book-to-market control firm benchmarks; however, this difference is insignificant. Results of the calendar-time portfolio methodology confirm these results. We also compare the difference in BHAR between fixed and variable price contracts for firms in the upper tercile of preevent stock returns (high-return stocks) with those in the lower tercile of pre-event stock returns (lowreturn stocks). The fixed price portfolio outperforms the variable price portfolio in the subsamples of low return and high return stocks by 38.1% (p < 0 01) and 53.3% (p < 0 01), respectively. Hence, pre-event stock return performance does not explain the difference in abnormal returns between fixed and variable price outsourcing contracts. We also stratify the sample firms based on their operating performance for the three-year period preceding the implementation of the outsourcing contract. The difference in BHAR between the fixed and variable price portfolios for firms in the upper tercile of pre-event operating performance is 30.7% (p < 0 01) and that for firms in the lower tercile of pre-event operating performance is 20.7% (p < 0 01). In both cases, an F -test does not reject the hypothesis that the abnormal returns for the fixed price contracts relative to the matched control firms are equal across the subsamples.
Determinants of Contract Choice and
Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns 5.6.1. Contract Choice. The outsourcing and contracting decisions are self-selected choices of the outsourcing firm. Failure to control for these selection processes, including unobserved heterogeneity that impacts these choices and also abnormal returns, will result in biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we use the specifications of contract choice and the decision to outsource, detailed in Tables 5 and 6 , respectively, to derive correction factors for these selection models that we include in our models of abnormal returns. The results for contract choice also confirm prior findings for the association between complexity of the outsourced task and relational environment and contract type. Table 5 reports the results for our model of contract choice. The first column of Table 5 Notes. Model I reports results of a probit estimation of contract choice with clustered standard errors. Contract choice is only observed for firms that engage in a significant outsourcing initiative. Model II uses a Heckman probit estimation to correct for the fact that unobserved factors that influence the decision to outsource also influence contract choice. However, the correlation between the residuals of the equations of outsourcing and contract choice is insignificant. Thus, we estimate self-selection into the outsourcing and contracting decisions separately and use the results of model I to calculate the inverse Mill's ratio. The characteristics of the outsourcing engagement that we consider in our analyses include anticipated interdependence and coordination complexity (COORDN), whether the underlying task involves application, network, and desktop management (APP) or business process outsourcing (BPO), or information systems outsourcing (ISO), length of the outsourcing contract (LENGTH), contract value (CONTRACTVAL), and prior cooperative association between the firms (PRIOR). Outsourced tasks also vary in the level of interdependence and hence, coordination requirements. At higher levels of interdependence, contingencies are hypothetical because they often depend on the action of the provider and the latter's accurate interpretation and timely responsiveness to the outsourcing firm's own actions. In such cases, it is costly to contractually specify a precise division of labor and responsibilities. Complexity associated with greater levels of coordination (COORDN) will result in more incomplete variable price contracts. Different types of outsourcing initiatives vary in their relative maturity and management challenges and hence, in the choice of governing contract. The complete specification of contingencies and time of performance in longer term contracts may be difficult and costly. On the other hand, expectations of continuity of the relationship inherent to longer term contracts may strengthen incentives and weaken the association between complexity of the contracting environment and contract choice, resulting in choice of fixed price contracts. We test these conflicting predictions by examining the influence of contract duration (LENGTH) on contract choice. We also examine the impact of CONTRACTVAL, if any, on the choice of variable price contracts. Finally, we test whether firms, through prior cooperative association (PRIOR), may have developed channels and codes for exchange of information. Greater competence in transacting with each other reduces complexity in the contracting context, and makes it easier for the firms to specify the management of the interface between them and provide incentives through more complete contracts. Finally, we control for firm capabilities that may influence contract choice. Uncertainty in business requirements of the outsourcing firm (UNCERTAINTY) increases the costs of completeness because it necessitates systematic allocation of resources to identify diverse action-outcome contingencies, and incorporate paths that are best aligned with the objectives of the outsourcing initiative. Thus, greater levels of environmental uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY) should result in more incomplete variable price agreements. Greater experience of the outsourcing firm in managing similar initiatives (EXP) should enable the outsourcing firm to better predict contingencies in its environment. Larger firms have superior financial, technological, and human resource endowments that render the design of complex contracts more efficient and less expensive. Thus, we expect that larger firms (SIZE) will design more complete contracts. Similarly, we control for firm variables-book-to-market ratio (BTM), short term cash needs (CASH), prior operating expenses (OPEX) and prior operational performance (PRIOROP_PERF)-that measure the financial health of the outsourcing firm. Our results show that business uncertainty, anticipated coordination requirements, and book-to-market ratio are positively related to the choice of a variable price contract. Prior cooperative association and outsourcing experience positively relate to choice of a fixed price contract. * p < 0 10, * * p < 0 05, * * * p < 0 01. sign. Each initiative is also coded as involving information systems outsourcing; business process outsourcing; or application, network, and desktop management. Three dummy variables, ISO, BPO, and APP capture this distinction. The default category included instances of information systems outsourcing (ISO). We find that the coefficients for application outsourcing (APP) and business process outsourcing (BPO) are positive and significant. Thus, these types of outsourcing initiatives are more likely to be governed by variable price contracts. This is likely because the relatively nascent nature of BPO and complex application development, and the greater interdependencies of the underlying task in these initiatives render it relatively difficult to predict and define all contingencies at the outset. The results for the other explanatory variables are also consistent with our theoretical expectations. Coefficients of business uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY), anticipated coordination complexity (COORDN), and contract value (CONTRACTVAL) are positive and significant, whereas that of prior association (PRIOR) and experience (EXP) are negative and significant. The positive effect of environmental uncertainty, anticipated coordination, and contract value of the initiative on the likelihood of choice of a variable price contract is consistent with the argument that variables indicative of increased environmental complexity are associated with variable price contracts accompanied by low levels of completeness in task specification (and hence, a high probability that adaptations are needed). Prior cooperative association between the outsourcing firm and provider as well as outsourcing experience facilitate less costly prediction of contingencies; greater ease in management of the interface between the outsourcing firm and the provider; and better knowledge of structures, processes, and technologies that help manage the initiative, resulting in more complete fixed price contracts.
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The contracting decision is only observed for firms that engage in an economically significant outsourcing initiative. The second column of Table 5 estimates a Heckman probit model of contract choice that controls for firm capabilities and unobserved heterogeneity that impact the decision to outsource and also likely influence the contracting decision. Following Hall and Liedtka (2005) , we include prior operating expenses (OPEX), short-term cash needs (CASH), market and book leverage (MKTLEV and 13 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) find that firms that work with a repeated client are more likely to be governed by a variable price time and materials contract. However, on introducing the interaction between working for a repeat client and the age of the firm, they find that this is not true for old firms. Their result is consistent with the finding for our sample that largely consists of large, established firms. Note. The model of the decision to outsource is used to obtain the correction for self-selection into the outsourcing decision. * p < 0 10, * * p < 0 05.
BKLEV), executive compensation (COMP), and CEO stock options (OPTIONS) in estimating the likelihood of outsourcing. Academic and industry surveys (e.g., Linder 2004 , Dibbern et al. 2004 ) find that firms primarily outsource to reduce costs and improve management's focus on more strategic issues. Thus, the higher the operating expenses, the greater should be the likelihood of outsourcing. Cash needs and financial leverage of the firm increase the likelihood that the firm will use outsourcing to transfer costly assets to the provider and convert capital to expense. Hall and Liedtka (2005) find that incentives created by CEO stock options and the overall compensation mix significantly influence the decision to outsource. The results for estimation of the model of outsourcing choice are presented in Table 6 and are consistent with the above theorized relationships. The estimated correlation between the errors of the outsourcing and contract choice equations, , is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the probit estimation does not require controlling for sample selection effects. Thus, we estimate separately the models of outsourcing and contract choices to obtain correction factors for self-selection into the outsourcing and contracting decisions, respectively. 5.6.2. Long-Term Abnormal Returns. Table 7 presents the results of our second-stage models of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. To test Hypothesis 2 and 3, we check for the significance of the impact of prior association (PRIOR) and experience (EXP) on BHAR. Model I examines the effect of contract choice on BHAR after controlling Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 for the endogeneity of such choice. Model II includes the drivers of contract choice that are estimated to be equivalent across both contract types. Model III uses a switching regression to assess the impact of different task, firm, and relational characteristics on BHAR in each of the contracts. The coefficient of contract choice in model I is significant and negative, confirming that the market underestimates the benefits of fixed price contracts. The results of model II suggest the influence of contract choice on abnormal returns observed in model I is likely explained by various factors that drive contract choice-uncertainty, coordination requirements, prior association-that also influence longterm BHAR. Model III separately estimates models of long-term BHAR for the two contract choices after correcting for self-selection. In line with theoretical expectations, we find that uncertainty in business requirements negatively impacts the BHAR to fixed price contracts. This is because the outsourced task environment responds to the firm's changing business requirements resulting in potentially costly renegotiation of the task specification in fixed price contracts.
Prior association with the provider and prior experience in managing similar outsourcing initiatives positively impact the BHAR to variable price contracts. The results provide support for Hypothesis 2 and 3, respectively. As theorized earlier, prior association and prior experience reflect relational and procedural learning of the outsourcing firm, respectively. Such learning helps in ex post adaptation through better planning and response to unforeseen contingencies in the task and relational environments. As noted earlier, these contextual attributes that positively affect BHAR in variable price contracts are also associated with increased likelihood of choice of fixed price contracts. However, certain tasks that are intrinsically dynamic because of changing business requirements or require more complex coordination will be governed by variable price contracts. Similarly, we find that greater interdependence between firms and anticipated coordination requirements that increase the likelihood of choice of a variable price contract are associated with decreased BHAR. This is because interdependencies increase the potential for coordination failures, cost overruns, and the ensuing risk of costly bargaining and privately favorable distribution of ex post surplus.
Thus, taken together with the results of the probit model, the results of the performance regressions suggest that the outsourcing contract is a proxy for the complexity of the underlying task and relational environments that impact performance gains from outsourcing. The market is slow to incorporate this signal provided by the contract so that there is systematic and predictable association between the factors that drive contract choice and long-term BHAR following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. The negative coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio in the model of BHAR further emphasizes that unobserved factors that impact contract choice also impact abnormal returns.
Discussion of Results and Conclusion
Large-scale outsourcing is considered as a strategic necessity for competitiveness by modern enterprises. Yet, as the focus of such outsourcing has evolved from pure cost savings to a myriad of strategic objectives including faster time to market and organizational flexibility, there has been a significant increase in business volatility, coordination complexity, and the challenges in realizing payoffs from such effort. Indeed, Downloaded from informs.org by [202.174.120 .2] on 16 November 2014, at 02:23 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
widespread failures of large outsourcing engagements have raised many questions regarding the antecedents of success. Given that these outsourcing initiatives involve significant changes to the structure and management of the value chain, they are likely to have implications for shareholder value. The extant IS literature has largely focused on announcement period returns in assessing the market value of outsourcing. We argue that the market incurs information acquisition and learning costs in pricing major outsourcing decisions, resulting in inefficient pricing of such events in the short run.
Our results for short-and long-term abnormal returns to outsourcing initiatives support our thesis of market inefficiency for both contract types. For fixed price contracts, the initial reaction of the market was negative −0.83% (p < 0 05), which is consistent with the −2.07% reported by Farag and Krishnan (2003) for cost cutting projects. However, the three-year BHAR of 17.5% (p < 0 05) suggests that the market initially underestimated the value created by outsourcing simple tasks performed in relatively stable environments. Fixed price contracts involve lower business uncertainty, coordination complexity, and measurability of output, all of which result in higher transferability of control and ownership to the vendor. The underlying tasks are unlikely to be central to the core business, and hence the long-term abnormal returns may indicate that the market rewards firms for externalizing these tasks and focusing attention on core competencies.
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The insignificant announcement-period returns for variable price contracts suggest the market's ambiguity regarding payoffs from such endeavors. However, in the long run, the market acquired and learned about capabilities necessary for the success of variable price contracts; firms with prior association with the vendor and outsourcing experience were rewarded relative to those that did not have such capabilities. Because prior association is a proxy for the presence of relational norms, trust, and reciprocity, our study extends the findings of Poppo and Zenger (2002) regarding the complementary relationship between complex contracts and relational norms to superior market performance.
Our results may help reconcile findings on market value created by outsourcing engagements focused on strategic and cost cutting objectives. For example, studies reporting negative announcement period reaction to cost cutting also reported positive reactions to strategic initiatives, and vice versa. However, our results for long-term returns suggest that both classes Information Systems Research 24(4), pp. 1028 -1049 , © 2013 initiative on the market value of the vendor. However, the total contract value, which is disclosed in the outsourcing announcement, represents a revenue increase for the vendor. Given that markets price tangible information or changes to measures of accounting performance more efficiently intangible information (Daniel and Titman 2006) , we expect the benefits to the vendor to be incorporated in its stock price during the announcement period. Further, the 100 largest contracts were awarded to a small sample of large vendors, characterized by lower levels of heterogeneity in reputation and ability than that of client firms to manage an outsourcing engagement. Thus, although it is beyond the scope of this study to consider market value implications for vendors, we expect the magnitude of increase in market value of the vendors to be correlated with the size of the outsourcing deal.
A key implication of our results is that as firm boundary decisions increase in their importance and scope, the ability to identify tasks that are best candidates for outsourcing and who these tasks must be outsourced to become important sources of competitive advantage. However, the significant impact of unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with contract choice and returns suggests the presence of alternative causal explanations. For instance, although the contract aligns incentives to address appropriation concerns, complementary noncontractible investments in relational processes and technologies improve ex post adaptation and reduce coordination failures by engendering mutual trust, facilitating timely information sharing and mutual adjustments in behavior, and aligning actions between participant firms (Gulati et al. 2005) . Thus, in addition to the learning perspective examined in the study, relational processes and technologies that complement the structure of risk and incentives in variable price contracts (Mani et al. 2012 ) may also likely explain variance in returns. Such investigation of alternative explanations presents interesting avenues for future research and has important implications.
What do the hypotheses portend for future abnormal returns? We do not expect the relationship between contract choice or its contextual determinants and abnormal returns to persist once the market has fully incorporated attributes of the outsourced task and outsourcing relationship into the price of the outsourcing firm. However, the firm boundary decision is representative of a broader class of managerial decisions that represents intangible information on future cash flows. The long-term price reaction to such managerial decisions is relatively unexamined in financial research. Yet, as indicated by our results, these management choices may be important firm characteristics that explain significant variance in stock returns and correlate with price scaled variables such as the book-to-market ratio that has historically explained returns. Future research could examine whether cross-sectional variation in common stock returns can be better explained by the quality of underlying management choices rather than sensitivity to the Fama and French (1993) factors. This, in turn, has important implications for portfolio analysis and design and performance measurement.
